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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
\
Plaintiff-Respondent, I
...
'

JAMES E. TRAVIS,

I Case No.
f 13834

V

Defendant-Appellant. /

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF T H E NATURE
OF T H E CASE "•
•'•'•"-'':
This is an appeal from a conviction of robbery in
the Third District Court for the State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN T H E LOWER COURT
The appellant, James E. Travis, was convicted by
a jury of the crime of robbery on August 29, 1974, in
the Court of the Honorable Jay E. Banks, and was
1
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sentenced to serve the indeterminate term provided by
law in the Utah State Prison, namely one to fifteen
years.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of
guilt entered against him and a new trial in this matter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts presented at trial were as follows:
Robert Charles ZancaneUa testified that at apvroximately 2:30 a.m. on June 26, 1974, he was in
Radio City Lounge with Blair E . Roberts, the night
bartender, who was cleaning up after closing the bar.
ZancaneUa, who was waiting for a cab, heard a knock
at the door, and upon opening the door he saw the appellant and William Kendrick. Hq further testified
that the appellant asked if he could come in and use
the phone to call the hospital because Mr, Robert's
roommate, Duane Daniejs, had become ill. The two
ttien pushed open the door and entered the bqir at the
moment Mr. Roberts reached the door from the inside. ZancaneUa testified that appellant said, "Don't
make a move," and pushed Roberts to the floor. The
witness then testified that Kendrick struck him in the
left side with something wooden such as a club, the
same shape as State's exhibit No. 7.
ZancaneUa testified on direct examination that ap2
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pellant then took his wallet. (R. 119 1st day) On cross
examination, however, he testified that Kendrick had
taken it. (R. 138 1st day) Although previously unable to make a positive identification, the witness testified that it was appellant who went behind the bar and
found the money. Shortly thereafter, the two men left.
On cross examination, the witness testified that he
heard one of the men say something to the effect of
"What are you doing? Let's get out of here." (R. 140
1st day)
The police immediately arrived at the scene of the
robbery and took the witness to the 1-80 overpass on
20th East where he identified the appellant and Kendrick as the perpetrators of the crime.
Helen Burns later testified that Zancanella had
testified at preliminary hearing that it was Kendrick,
and not the appellant, who first asked to use the phone
and that the appellant didn't enter the bar until shortly
thereafter. (R. 197-198 2nd day) She further testified that at preliminary Rearing, Zancanqjla testified
that he could give positive identificaifion of Kendrick but only tentative identification of appellant, while
on the 1-80 overpass and at trial he testified that he
positively identified both of theni at that time.
Blair Eldon Roberts, the bartender on duty on the
night of June 25 and morning of June 26, 1974, testified that he was cleaing up the bar at approximately
3
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2:30 a.m. when he was summoned to the front door by
Mr. Zaneanella who was waiting for a cab. H e testified
that it was the appellant who told him that Duane was
sick, but at preliminary hearing he had been unable to
ascertain which of the two had told him that. It was at
that point, he testified, that he got hit and fell to the
floor. When he came to, Kendrick asked him for his
money and he complied. On cross examination he testified that he heard one of the men say to the other
"What are you doing? Stop that. Let's get out of
here. Let's go Jack, we've done enough . . . damage
in here." H e testified that he never saw the appellant
go behind the bar, and the only object he saw was a
round wooden or metal container which stuck approximately 10 inches out of Kendrick's pocket. (IL 128129,2pdday)
Officer W . G. Hatch testified that in response
to;a dispatch at approximately 8:20.ami. on June.26,
1974, he stopped the car in which appellant was riding.
H e further testified that co-defendant Kendrick was
seated in the right rear seat, appellant was in the front
passenger side and Lynn Rewe was driving* (R. 135-.
157 5 2ridday) ,..:•;.
. ..:._ . ,.;;:
^;;;.S.«r^eilt:.Glaytoii IS* Conger testified that on J u n e ;
26, 1974 in the early morning hours, he went to 1-80 at;
approximately 20th East where he searched the above
mentioned car. H e found a money bag under the right
front seat containing $79.17 in coins. (R. 191-194, 2nd
day)
4
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Officer Stephen JLi.a.mon*, testify •* ...... *irj*r»-\•
mately 10:00 or 11:00 n.m. .»n J ' U I . •„'*;. t**T »-, b>
searched ih« trailer arid rjn n: i f u < i
;ppellant and
Kendrick were riding UIUMI tlu-\ WCK arretted. l i e
f'.-und :« n«!I -V currency undei tin Vn h v/al and
loose change on the front seat totaling $19:193, H e
also found a wrecking bar with an extension cord
u ^ p p e d around it under the ruhher n^p- I>-«I* >J *iw.
auver's seat. (R, 174-183, 2nd day)
K. Travis testified that of ,MIP, J/I .*« »
Lynn K< w» atui William Kendrick stopped i.> ^ -4
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Vngeles t<> \i w Jersev where emplovmeni awaited.
The +hree had left Los Angeles in two cars, hut shortly
after their departure, the appellant's ear had broken
down. H e sold the car, rented a TVHaul trailer which
Rewe and Kendrick agreed to pull with Itewe's car.
Due tc proM< JUS will) th«- rai overheating, they planned
to tra^ el at nigh*
K. ?12-216, 2nd day)
Th» appellant testified HrM they spent the day
dning errundb in Salt Lake City and at approximately
J 00 a.m. on J u n e 36, he, Kendrick and Rewe went
into Radio City Lounge for a beer. There they met
D u a n e Daniels who invited them to a p a r t y at his
home, Travis testified that the three of them left the
vtiili DrmeK w\ approximately 2:00 a.iiu A t D a n iels' house, Kendrick wjh upsef 1>\ homosexual advances
made h\ n^-ii-h Consequent i\\ flic npprllnnt K
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drick and Re we immediately left the house to return
to their motel. (R. 217-218)
The appellant further testified that en route to the
motel, while passing Radio City Lounge, Kendrick told
Re we to stop the car so he could "get even with those
faggots." (R. 220-222). H e testified that when Kendrick got out of the car, he followed him, grabbed him
by the arm and unsuccessfully tried to dissuade him
from going back into the bar. (R. 223) Kendrick proceeded toward the bar and the appellant went back to
the car. (R. 223) The appellant testified he then went
to the Lounge to retrieve Kendrick and through a
window in the door saw Kendrick hit the bartender,
Mi\ Roberts, in the head with something. (R. 223-224)
The appellant testified he immediately entered the bar
and stepped in between Kendrick and Mr. Zancanella,
preventing Kendrick from striking the latter. Kendrick
instead hit the appellant once in the leg and once in the
shoulder, causing it to bleed. H e testified that he did
not know what Kendrick hit him with, but it was something other than a fist. (R. 224) The appellant testified Kendrick temporarily disappeared from sight and
he then told Mr. Roberts and. Mr. Zancanella to lay
on the floor and he would not let Kendrick hurt them.
(R. 225) H e testified that when Kendrick reappeared,
he grabbed him by the arm and said " L e t s get the hell
out of here/' and went out the door of the lounge. The
appellant testified he waited a few seconds and when
Kendrick didn't appear, he went back inside, retrieved
Kendrick, and the two men left together. (R. 225)
6
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The appellant testified the three then drove back
to their motel and he suggested they pack their things
to leave Salt Lake City. H e testified Kendrick then
produced some money and told the appellant it belonged partly to him. The appellant asked him where
the money came from, and when Kendrick said he took
it from the bar, the appellant refused to take any of it.
(R. 226) Since they had intended to leave that night
anyway, ^tnd because of their trouble at the bar, they
prepared to depart; Kendrick packed things in the car,
and the appellant packed the U-Haul trailer, and
hooked it to the car. (R. 227)
The appellant further testified that as they left
the motel for the freeway to leave the city, Mrs. Rewe
was driving, he was riding in the front seat and Mr.
Kendrick was riding in the back seat. (R. 228) The
car was stopped by police officers on the freeway ramp
to J-80 at 20th East. The appellant denied having seen
the money bag or the pawn ticket prior to the trial. (R.
228) The appellant also testified that the charges
against Ms. Rewe had been dismissed and he had been
unable to locate her to aid in his defense.
Counsel for the appellant and the prosecutor
agreed that if he had been available to testify, Officer
Vaughn would have testified that shortly after the
arrest, the officers questioning the appellant noticed a
fresh cut on appellant's shoulder and blood stains on
the inside right shoulder of his shirt. (R. 284, 2nd day).
7
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In addition to testimony presented at trial, the
attorney for appellant attempted to introduce into
evidence a prior statement made under oath in open
court by the co-defendant, William Kendrick. (R. 278279, 3rd day) The statement corroborated appellant's
testimony and exonerated appellant from any criminal
activity. This had been preceded by appellant's attorney's effort to call the co-defendant Kendrick as a
witness in the case. Upon hearing that co-defendant
Kendrick intended to refuse to testify on the grounds
that his testimony might tend to incriminate him, Judge
Banks refused to allow him to take the stand. (R. 208209, 2nd day)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJ U D I C I A L ERROR BY R E F U S I N G
TO
A L L O W A P P E L L A N T TO C A L L A S A W I T NESS A CO-DEFENDANT FACING A SEPA R A T E T R I A L ON T H E C H A R G E M E R E L Y
BECAUSE.THE CO-DEFENDANT INTENDE D TO I N V O K E H I S P R I V I L E G E A G A I N S T
SELF-INCRIMINATION..
Although appellant and one William Kendrick
were charged as co-defendants in the above-entitled
matter, the Honorable Jay E . Banks, after an evidentiary hearing and motion by attorneys for both defend8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ants, severed the charges and ruled that appellant was
to be tried first. At appellant's trial, appellant's attorney called to the stand the former co-defendant
Kendrick, not on trial at that time. After dismissing
the jury, and before witness Kendrick took the stand,
the Judge asked Kendrick and his attorney if Kendrick
intended to testify. Kendrick stated he intended to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination. Upon
learning this, the Judge dismissed Kendrick, and over
the objection of appellant, refused to allow him to be
called as a witness. (R. 208-210, 2nd day)
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is available to any witness or accused in a
criminal prosecution, however, it is a privilege which
is not absolute. A common limitation which has been
expressed by many courts is that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is by nature a personal privilege and therefore must be claimed by the individual involved. In
addition, many courts, when faced with the question,
have held the privilege must be raised with respect to
specific questions and cannot be asserted as a blanket
prohibition against inquiry.
This position was explicitly state4 by the Court in
Gowen v. WilkersQn, 364 Fed. Supp. 1043, (U.S. Dist.
Gt., W . D . Va. 1973), a habeas corpus probeeding contesting a contempt conviction and sentence. The defendant was called as an adverse witness to explain
why he failed to make support payments to his wife.
Since his testimony could also be used against him in a
9
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criminal prosecution, the defendant refused to answer
any questions. The court refused to review the sentence
since it was within the limits of the state statute; however the court stated the situation was such that although the defendant was entitled to assert his Fifth
Amendment privilege, he had raised the privilege improperly in this instance.
But even if the danger of self-incrimination was
great, petitioner's remedy was not to voice a
blanket refused to testify, as his counsel intimates was done, but rather to take the stand and
as to each question elect to raise or not to raise
the Fifth Amendment privilege. 364 F . Supp.
at 1045.
A similar position was enunciated by the Sixth
Circuit in U.S. v. Harmon, 339 F.2d 354 (U.S. Ct.
of Appeals ,6th Cir. 1964) where the defendant was
convicted of embezzlement and conversion of union
fuiids. In his appeal, the defendant claimed prejudicial
error in the trial judge's ruling allowing counsel for
the Government to call three witnesses who had stated,
prior to being called, that they would refuse to testify
on the grounds that it may incriminate thenio The Appellate Court found no prejudicial error and upheld the
conviction. In its decision, the court stated:
The privilege against self-incrimination may not
be asserted in advance of questions actually propounded In no event may the witness refuse to
be sworn. . . . We do not believe that the trial
judge had the right to preclude either party
10
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from calling witnesses. The District Judge had
the opportunity to pass upon the issue only
when the witnesses were sworn and invoked their
privilege. 339 F.2d at 359.
The facts of the matter currently before the Court
present a more blatant example of error by the Trial
Judge than existed in the previously cited cases. In a
voir dire examination of the co-defendant, out of the
presence of the jury, the judge refused to allow appellant's attorney to call the co-defendant as a witness:
(Jurors leave the room.)
C O U R T : The record may show that Mr. Kendrick is in the room and he is represented by Mr.
HousleVc Have you had a chance to talk with
him about claiming the Fifth Amendment?
MR. H O U S L E Y s I have your Honor.
C O U R T : And have you advised him to claim
the Fifth Amendment ?
A. Yes sir, I have advised him and also to
claim his rights under Rule 23, under the Utah
Rules of Evidence.
C O U R T i Mr. Kendrici;, if you were called to
the stand and questioned about this incident,
would you claim the Fifth Amendment ?
. • " ;•" MR. K E M D R I C K r Y e s sir, I would.

.

C O U R T : All right, you may remove him from
the court room.
MR. K E L L E R : Your Honor, if it please
the Court, whether or not—if he claims the Fifth
Amendment I believe I have a right to call him
as a witness. H e is not the accused in this trial.
11
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The accused is Mr. Travis. Now if he desires to
take the Fifth Amendment there is nothing you
can do about that, but certainly I have the right
to call him and nothing that I know of says that
I can't call him as a witness.
C O U R T : That's right, but he indicated he
will claim the Fifth Amendment. (R. 208-209)
This blanket refusal by the trial judge to even
allow co-defendant Kendrick to be sworn, constitutes
a violation of the law established by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Harmon, supra, and
the U.S. District Court for W . D . Va. in Gowen, supra.
The prejudice of such error by a trial judge was dramatically illustrated by the United States Supreme Court
in the landmark decision of Hoffman v. U.S., 341 U.S.
479, 71 S.C. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1950). In that decision the Court said:
But this protection must be confined to instances
where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer. The witness
is not exonerated frorfi answering merely because
he declares that in so doing he would incriminate
himself—his say-so does not of itself establish the
hazard of incrimijiatione I t is for the court to
say whether his silence is justfied . . . and to require him to answer if 'it.dearly appears to the
court that he is mistakep.' . . .. To.sustain the
privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which
it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. The trial judge, in apprais12
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ing the claim 'must be governed as much by his
personal perception of the peculiarities of the
case as by the facts actually in evidence. . .' 341
U.S. at 486-487.
In the matter before the Court, co-defendant Kendrick had given a prior statement under oath in support
of his motion for a separate trial, as did defendant
Travis. (See R. 336-340) In this statement, made to
help the court determine whether or not a conflict between the defenses of the two defendants existed and
therefore grounds for separate trials, Kendrick denied
any criminal involvement on his part as to a robbery,
and specifically exculpated Travis from any participation in or knowledge of a robbery. (R. 339)
Prior to the time Kendrick made this statement,
his counsel had admonished him that he was under oath
and subject to penalty for perjury if he testified falsely.
(R.336)
Appellant maintains that at the very least, the
trial judge should have allowed Kendrick to be called
as a witness by appellant, and then the Judge should
have made a determination with each individual question as to whther or not Kendrick could assert his privilege against self-incriminatianc This becomes remarkably clear* iq. light of Kendrick's prior statement which
the Judge could easily have concluded did not incriminate him. The mandate of the U.S. Supreme Court
is clear. It is the trial judge's duty to determine
whether or not a witness has "reasonable cause to ap13
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prehend danger from a direct answer."
Hoffman,
supra. The substance of Kendrick's statement relating
to appellant corroborates appellant's testimony at his
own trial concerning his involvement in the incident;
that appellant's participation consisted solely of ak
tempting to prevent Kendrick from beating up the
homosexuals in Radio City Lounge. Therefore, Kendrick's testimony was not incriminating and he was
improperly excluded as a witness in appellant's trial.
In the present case, co-defendant Kendrick's previous testimony tended to exonerate appellant from any
participation in the robbery. Consequently, the trial
judge's failure to inquire as to the substance of Mr.
Kendrick's potential testimony and his refusal to allow
Mr. Kendrick to take the stand constituted such prejudicial error that a new trial is mandated.
Such a result was reached in N.J. v. Jennings, 312
A.2d 864 (Sup. Ct. N.J., Appellate Div. 8-30-72),
where the defendant had been convicted of manslaughter
by a jury . A t a voir dire examination, (with the jury
excused) of a key defense witness, the witness testified
he had been with the defendant at the time of the killing and that the defendant had acted in selfTdefense„
The trial judge ruled the witness did not have to testify
because it would tend tp incriminate him. TJie Court
held that permitting a witness' Counsel to invoke the
privilege for his client is reversible error. In ordering
a new trial, the Court stated that if the witness were
called at the new trial
14
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. . . the latter shall be required to take the stand
before the jury, under oath (or affirmation),
await specific questions, and either answer them
or personally assert and demonstrate a basis for
not doing so grounded in a claim of self-incrimination. 312 A.2d at 868-869.
In the present case, co-defendant Kendrick's Fifth
Amendment privilege in no way would have been jeopardized by his relating to the jury testimony he had
previously given in open court. The excluded testimony was exculpatory for the appellant and Mr. Kendrick was the only person with the knowledge of the
situation to be able to support appellant's own testimony. As a result, the erroneous exclusion withheld
vital information from the jury and was highly prejudicial to the appellant.

POINT II
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D BY R E F U S I N G TO A D M I T I N T O E V I D E N C E T H E A F F I D A V I T M A D E P R E V I O U S L Y B Y CO-DEFENDANT KENDRICK.
At the hearing on the motion to sever the trials
of-co-defendants. Kendrick ."and appellant, Mr. Kendrick, who was represented by counsel, made a statement while under oath which tended to exculpate appellant. At appellant's trial Mr. Kendrick asserted his
privilege against self-incrimination and on that basis
15
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the trial judge refused to allow him to be called as a
defense witness. The U. S. Ct. of Appeals for the 10th
Circuit has consistently held that when a witness invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege he is considered
"unavailable" and transcripts of his prior testimony
will be admitted in corollary proceedings. Such was the
result in U.S. v. Allen, 409 F.2d 611 (U. S. Ct. of
Appeals, 10th Cir. 1969.) In that case witnesses had
invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination and the Trial Court held that they were
"unavailable" and admitted transcripts of their testimony made at preliminary hearing. Affirming the
Trial Court's decision, the Appellate Court said that:
"the requirement of unavailability is satisfied when the
witness is physically present but the testimony is unavailable because of the invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege." 409 F.2d at 613. The Court went on
to say that transcripts of the witnesses' testimony at
preliminary hearing could be used at tfie trial of the
defendant and stated "that the test is the opportunity
for full and complete cross examination rather than
the use which is made of that opportunity." 409 F.2d
at 613.
A more persuasive pronouncement, made by the
same court, is found in Mason v+. UM. and Gladney v..
U.Sc, 408 F.2d 903 (U.S. C t of Appeals, 10th Cir.
1969.) In Mason the Trial Court permitted the use
of witnesses' testimony in a prior trial to be admitted
in a subsequent trial, after reversal and remand from
the Circuit Court, where the witnesses invoked their
16
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privilege against self-incrimination at the subsequent
trial. The court stated that the controlling element
under the rule which permits such testimony is "whether
the testimony oi the witness is sought and is available
and not whether the witness' body is available." 408
F.2dat906.
Further, in U.S. v. Mobley, 421 F.2d 345 (U.S.
Ct. of Appeals, 5th Cir. 1971) the court allowed the
introduction of testimony from a previous trial where
the witness asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege at
a subsequent trial stating that the witness "was no less
available than he would have been at instances of death
or absence of country or physical inability to speak."
421 F.2d at 351.
The Utah Rules of Evidence as adopted by the
Utah Supreme Court, effective July 1, 1971, also recognizes this interpretation of ^unavailable" in Rule
62 (7).
" 'Unavailable as a witness' includes situations
where the witness is (a) exempted on the ground
of privilege from testifying concerning the matter to which his statement is relevant'.••> .J>
..Since co-defendant Kendrick, through his counsels
told the trial judge that he intended to exercise his
privilege against self-incrimination were he to be called
as a witness, he should have been deemed "unavailable"
for the purposes of that trial pursuant to Rule 62 (7).
17
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Having concluded that Kendrick's insistence on
his privilege against self-incrimination at appellant's
trial makes him unavailable as a witness pursuant to
the case law and the Utah Rules of Evidence, we turn
to the issue of whether or not Kendrick's prior sworn
statement in opeji court (R. 336-340) should have been
admissable in appellant's trial.
At trial, appellant's attorney moved to introduce
Kendrick's prior affidavit or sworn statement in open
court. (R. 278 3rd day.) The trial judge denied the
motion and appellant properly objected and took exception to the court's ruling. (R. 279 3rd day.) Appellant contends that this affidavit was proper evidence
under Rule 63 (2) which is the affidavit exception to
the hearsay rule. I t states: "Affidavits to the extent
admissible by the statutes and rules of this state" (as
in Rule 43 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure)
are admissable as exceptions to the hearsay rule.
I t was highly prjudicial not to allow into evidence
the sworn statement made by co-defendant Kendrick
because that statement was highly probative and essential to the defense of appellant Without any corroboration of appellant^ defense, his testimony lacked the
credibility Mr. Kendrick's statement would have afforded it. The statement, had it been admitted, would
have had the additional value of having been a declaration against interest and therefore admissable under
another exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 63 (10),
since Mr. Kendrick admitted going into the bar for
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the purpose of assaulting the occupants. H e explained
that appellant only then entered the bar in an effort to
stop him. The jury could have more easily accepted
appellant's testimony had Mr. Kendrick's statement
been admitted as support for that testimony. The statement made by Mr. Kendrick should have been introduced to the jury for their evaluation of appellant's
defense. I t was prejudicial not to allow the statement
into evidence since it was the or*ly evidence which
could have supported appellant's contention. Without
it, the jury had to rely on appellant's word alone without any corroboration.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, it is requested that the judgment of the trial court be reversed and the defendant
granted a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
L A R R Y R. K E L L E R ,
Attorney for Appellant
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